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A PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE LAW*
JEROME BRUNER**

Having worked with lawyers at the New York University Law School
these past few years, I think it might be instructive to reflect on the sorts
of issues that a psychologist is likely to encounter once he begins engaging
with legal scholars. The very briefest summary of the matter is that when
a psychologist is principally interested in what has come to be called "the
social construction of reality"1 (as I am), then the law provides an ideal
arena for study. For the "world of law"-its corpus juris, its procedures,
and its customary practices-is almost the quintessential example of such
a socially constructed reality. But before launching into this complex
subject, let me first situate this discussion in the field of psychology itself,
for there are different "kinds" of psychology.
Roughly speaking, psychologists can be divided into two broad
classes. The first and oldest of these looks to the "laws of nature" as its
means of explicating human nature. True explanation for such
psychologists reduces to specifying the interplay between a material
organism and a material world, and the explanations are extensions of the
principles in terms of which one accounts for other aspects of nature.
Mind is, as it were, simply a mirror of nature. This is positivism.2
According to this positivist view, the study of mind can be virtually
reduced to a laboratory science, since all the complexities and subtleties
of mental functioning are merely the interplay of nature's elementary
processes that can be studied in vitro. Positivism is the way of purity and
self-containedness whose ideal, of course, is physics. Its aim in
psychology is to reduce the brute data of people's observable responses to
general laws about man as a natural organism. It rejects explanations that
rest upon how people construe the world or what they believe reality to
be. Such "folk psychology"' is to be replaced by scientific psychology
wedded to the ideal of causal explanation and prediction. Positivist
psychology has brought off some stunning local successes in the study of
perception, memory, and even in the tortuous domain of thought and the
* This article is based on the remarks the author delivered as a commentator at the
New York Law School Lawyering Theory Symposium, Mar. 1992.
** Senior Research Fellow, New York University School of Law.

1. See PETER L. BERGER & THoMAs LUCKMANN, THE SOcIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REAIrIY (1966).
2. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATuRE (1979).

3. See STEPHEN P. STICH, FROM FoLK PSYCHOLOGY TO CoGNrrIVESCIENCE: THE
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so-called higher mental processes. At its worst, of course, it ignores
altogether that human beings live in history and in a culture-that they act

on the basis of the meanings they impose upon events or happenings or
upon people's acts.
Some critics, like Clifford Geertz, characterize positivist psychology
as a "perverse alchemy" that seeks to turn gold into lead.4 That is surely
too harsh. So-called scientific psychology, after all, is one way of
imparting an air of stability and universality to our conception of man. It
provides a useful metaphor and is rather like a promissory note that
assures the lender eventual payment in the form of "laws of nature." And
all science is metaphor, a kind of "paradigm," as Kuhn calls it, for
helping us get things clearer for certain purposes.' But for many
purposes, a natural-science explanation is insufficient, particularly when
the issue under scrutiny has to do with the nature of meaning and how
people construct their meanings. A good example is the transformation in
our understanding of the meaning of a concept like "equal opportunity"
as one moves through over a half-century from Plessy v. Ferguson6 to
Brown v. Board of Education.7 Such problems bring into being a second

kind of psychologist, the kind that takes meaning making as its central
concern. 8

Their argument is that the human mind and mental functioning cannot
be studied as if they were in bottles or in some aboriginal reality outside
of human culture. Our mental acts are always situated in the social world.
Indeed, their very form as well as their expression depend upon prosthetic
devices that are made available only through participation in a culture.
These devices include such things as language, modes of reckoning, and
notions of what is expectable. They also include a system and practice of
laws and the long shadow that law casts. By this view, the idea of an
original human nature to be found in vitro is not only a fiction, but a
mischievous one most often created to support covert ideological ends. For
convenience, this second outlook can be labelled "cultural psychology." 9
A typical axiom associated with this view is that it is impossible to
understand the nature of thought without understanding the manner in
which it is formed in and patterned by the context of a culture's dialogic
4. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIvE

ANTHROPOLOGY 182 (1983).

5. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990).
9. See id. at 19; RICHARD A. SHWEDER,
EXPEDITIONS IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991).
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styles. An analagous view from the realm of legal thinking is that you
cannot know a concept of law just from an examination of statutes and
principles, but must know as well how it is used in prevailing practice.
The aim of this article is not to settle once and for all the battle
between positivist and cultural psychologists. The great physicist, Niels
Bohr, once commented on the difference between small truths and big
truths. The opposite of a small truth, he said, is false, but the opposite of
a big one is usually also true. The two views of psychology exist without
contradicting each other. They are both true, but the choice between them
makes an enormous difference in how you ply your trade as a psychologist
and whom you regard as your kissing cousins.
I am a cultural psychologist, but with a history of positivist deviation.
I usually know when I am being one rather than the other. In the legal
domain, however, there is no choice. Law is the domain of cultural
psychology.
II.
Many psychologists study the nature and development of the so-called
cognitive processes in human beings. This includes the study of how
people go about reaching decisions, making judgments, and coming to
conclusions. Most of this work has been limited to how people solve what
logicians call well-formed problems in deductive reasoning, or problerps
in induction based on empirical evidence, or neat puzzles like Missionaries
and Cannibals or The Tower of Hanoi. Interest in such well-formed
problems was fueled by the ideal of building computational models that
treated human intelligence as an extension of machine intelligence (what
we now call Artificial Intelligence). Computers can deal only with wellformed problems.10 The emphasis on computationalism left virtually
unexplored a vast range of culturally sensitive cognitive activities directed
to making sense of ill-formed problems, such as recounting what happened
in the office today or justifying why one said one thing to a friend rather
than another. Efforts have been made to convert problem solving in such
rn-formed domains into something classier and more formal. Rational
Choice Theory is one example. 1 These efforts require such stilted
assumptions about the utility values of alternative moves, that they turn illformed problems into thinly disguised versions of Missionaries and
Cannibals. Worse still, when such rational approaches are applied, people
are treated as if they were unsituated, without histories, passions, or
cultural expectations. So that way has not worked very well.
10. Hubert Dreyfus & Stuart Dreyfus, Why Computers May Never Think Like
People, TEcH. REV., Jan. 1986, at 42, 47.
11. See BRUNER, supranote 8, at 28.
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To understand how people interpret a task, a problem, an event,
requires that you know one crucial point first. What did they think would
ordinarily or canonically happen under the circumstances? One of the most
basic forms of cognitive activity is figuring out the relation between what
you are encountering now and what the world is supposed to be like under
present circumstances: finding a mode of interpreting how things are in
the light of how they are supposed to be.
The difference between how the world is and how it is supposed to be
is almost invariably accounted for narratively, by telling a story about how
it came about that the expectable failed to occur. 12 Stories are so
compelling and useful a way of representing deviations from expectancy
in the world that cultures typically include a good stock of them in their
tool kit of ready mades. This tool kit is, of course, one of a culture's great
treasures. It is used incessantly. Studies of white, working-class families
in Baltimore13 show, for example, that children who hang around adult
conversations are exposed to real-life narratives at the rate of about six per
hour, sixty per ten-hour day, 22,000 per year, or about 500,000 by the
time they get to a law school. The estimate is conservative. Besides, all
societies give special status to those who can tell compelling stories out of
violations of canonical
their imagination about possible,
with.
copedimaginable
expectancy and how they were
It is no accident that narratives have two clearly distinguishable
features: an account of what happened, and a slightly less explicit
indication of why the account is worth telling and being heard. The latter
tells or implies why the former is unusual or noncanonical. 14 Unless both
are present and interpretable, a narrative has no point. The typical story
begins with an enunciation of the expected ("I was walking down the
street the other day, and . . ."), followed by a breach ("this tough guy
comes up to me and starts X-ing..."), followed by an attempted redress
("So I said to him, 'watch where you're going...'"), followed by some
sort of resolution ("So he said, 'Hey, I thought you were somebody
else.'"), concluded by a coda to bring you back to the here and now
("Isn't that the damndest thing you ever heard?").
Note well that the world of stories is not the impersonal physical
world of causes and effects but the world of human beliefs, desires,
12. See id.
13. See Peggy J. Miller & Barbara B. Moore, Narrative Conjunction of Caregiver
and Child, 17 ETHOS 43-61 (1989).
14. The pioneering account of the formal structure of narrative is found in William
Labov & Joshua Waletzky, NarrativeAnasyis: Oral Versions of PersonalExperience,
ESSAYS ON THE VERBAL AND VISUAL ARTS-PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1966 ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICALSOCIETY 12-44 (June Helm ed., 1967). For

in

a fuller account, see BRUNER, supra note 8, at 33-65.
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intentions, and dramatic necessities, however mundane. In trying to make
sense of a story, even to figure out whether it is true or right-whether
from the bench, in an armchair reading, or in conversation-we search for
the golden thread of rights and responsibilities in the network of human
circumstances recounted. In so doing, we use the story not only as a way
of representing what happened, but to pass judgment on what happened.
Without explicitly intending to, stories carry a moral in recounting what
is taken for granted and what is taken as a breach. So, narrative is
implicitly (if subtly) judgmental, which is probably why novelists are
among the first victims of the new dictator.
By the third year of life, children have the rudiments of the narrative
art well in hand." And almost as soon as they grasp its form, they seem
able to use it deftly not only to tell what happened, but to plead their case
by their management of the telling.16 From the start, it would seem,
narratives are used not only to construct or constitute reality, but also,
with cunning rhetorical design, to plead a case. Stories are profoundly
rhetorical: they provide the medium for making excuses, for justifying our
acts, for framing mitigating circumstances.' 7
HI.
Given what I have said thus far, it is no surprise that narrative plays
such a central part in legal procedure."8 Legal narratives are, of course,
contending versions of a story offered up for adjudication. All adjudication
is premised upon someone's presumed ability to decide which competing
narrative version is truer, righter, or provides a better fit to some point of
law. In the standard rendering of Anglo-Saxon law, what actually
happened is supposed to be a "matter of fact" to be decided by a jury that
hears a ease pleaded in a fashion constrained by rules of evidence and the
like. Matters of fact are supposed to be independent of and distinct from
points of law. The latter are broad principles illustrated by precedents of
their prior application. It is taken for granted, of course, that this sharp
separation sometimes breaks down. But it has only been in recent years
that legal scholars have begun to wonder whether the sharp separation is
anything more than a useful fiction." The malaise that such skepticism
15. See Jerome Bruner & Joan Lucariello, NarrativeRecreation of the World, in
NARRATIVES FROM THE CRm 73, 80 (Katherine Nelson ed., 1989).
16. JuDY DUNN, THE BEGIDmxos OF SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING 145 (1989).
17. See John L. Austin, A Pleafor Excuses, in P LOsOIpmCAL PAPERS 175-204 (2d

ed. 1970).
18. See BERNARD S. JACKsoN, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE (1988).

19. See id.
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creates often leads legal scholars to turn a deaf ear toward many of the
major issues of epistemology that have set the tone of modern
philosophical debate. 2 Yet, it is not that much of a practical disaster to
accept that matters of fact, even when filtered through rules of evidence,
oaths, and cross-examination, do not, after all, speak for themselves. In
many ways, facts are constructed in response to value judgments that exist
either in the broader society or in the law itself, as Kim Lane Scheppele
makes clear in the present issue of this journal. 21 This has always been
so, and it becomes unsettling only when it is ignored.
The tradition of legal positivism probably has had a good deal to do
with the ignoring. Ronald Dworkin, though a critic of positivism,
describes its position succinctly. How well does a particular story or
collection of facts fit a certain point of law? "The law of a community is
a set of special rules used by the community directly or indirectly for the
purpose of determining which behavior will be punished or coerced by the
public power."' If the accepted account of what happened is not clearly
covered by such a rule, give or take some judicial discretion, then the case
cannot be decided by applying the law.'
The fit between matters of fact and points of law illustrates an
interesting feature of our legal process. The special rules that constitute
the law of a community are not simply criterial subsumption rules as with
such natural-kind categories, as say, animals or minerals. Again Dworkin
trying to give a fair account of the traditional view: "[These special rules
[that constitute the law] can be... distinguished by specific criteria, by
tests having to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the
manner in which they were adopted or developed."' Precedents selected
by tests of pedigree guide one toward valid application of a rule of law.
Now I must confess that psychologically (leave aside legally) this
sounds a daunting, if not impossible task. One can always be sure,
however, that when something that is widely practiced seems theoretically
to be virtually impossible, it is invariably not the practice but the theory
that is impossible. It is this odd disjunction between legal practice and
legal theory that poses the challenge. This is not simply a cultural
psychological question; part of the difficulty resides in the guarded way
that lawyers themselves describe what the law is about. A reading of the
great masters of jurisprudence provides some interesting hints.
20. See RORTY, supra note 2.
21. See Kim L. Scheppele, Just the FactsMa'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 123 (1992).
22. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17 (1977).
23. See id. at 17-21.
24. Id. at 17.
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A judge, for example, is bound by judicial tradition to treat a case as
similar to specific past cases that he singles out as precedents. But some
forms of similarity are deep and more established than others. Our judge
is enjoined, therefore, to choose precedents in a principled way. The
question is how univocally can principle operate in guiding the choice of
precedents? Do the principles in Brown v. Board of Education' also fit
Green v. County School Board?' Or Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission 7l The multiple principles for
achieving racial balance are not so much to be found in statutes or in the
precedent cases as they are to be drawn from them by acts of

interpretation. To carry out such interpretation is much less like scientific

induction or logical deduction than it is like applying a moral principle or
a cultural maxim. Given the nature of interpretation, particularly since it
is the interpretation of stories that is at issue, it could not be otherwise.
But legal positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart (if indeed he is one),
believe that moral principles and legal rules should be held totally distinct
from each other, and that only the latter have relevance in deciding a case.
They then admit (often rather cheerfully) that rarely will particular cases
under adjudication uniquely or formally fit abstract rules of law, even with
the guidance of precedents. For example, Hart states:
Any honest description of the use of precedent in English law
must allow a place for the following pairs of contrasting facts.
First, there is no single method of determining the rule for which
a given authoritative precedent is an authority. Notwithstanding
this, in the vast majority of decided cases there is very little
doubt. The head-note is usually correct enough. Secondly, there
is no authoritative or uniquely correct formulation of any rule to
be extracted from cases. On the other hand, there is often very
general agreement, when the bearing of a precedent on a later
case is in issue, that a given formulation is adequate.'
A relevant story is told about Garret Fitzgerald who, while first minister
of the Irish Republic, was offered a plan for the economic development
of the country by a very bright and experienced businessman. It was
fantastic, practical, and smashing, and seemed surefire. "I see how it
works in practice," he was alleged to have said, "but there's only one
25.
26.
27.
28.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT Op LAW 181 (1961).
29. Id. at 131.
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problem. How does it work in theory?" The same can be said about
jurisprudence. The law works moderately well, although there is some
worry whether it will go on doing so. A version of Fitzgerald's question
is still worth asking: How well do theories of law capture what law does
in practice?
Such questions can be approached both top down and bottom up. The
top-down questions are about how the Supreme Court actually decides
specific cases. We can narrow this down by asking how decisions are
affected by the narrative forms used in characterizing a case. A review of
Supreme Court holdings quickly suggests that it is more than fit that
determines which precedent cases are cited. As much to the point is the
narrative genre in which a case has been framed by the judge. Genre has
a potent effect. Village of Euclid, Ohio v.Ambler Realty Co.' provides
a good example. Justice Sutherland structured his interpretation of the
facts of the case into a classic narrative that justified zoning in terms of
the great themes of protecting hearth and home against intruders, against
smoking factory chimneys, even against high-rise apartment buildings.
Given that choice of narrative, it was not difficult for him to conceive of
zoning power as an extension of police power for enforcement of the
general welfare. He could as readily have centered his narrative on the
issue of the exclusion of the less well-off by the imposition of zoning and
introduced an obligation for a community to provide affordable housing
for those excluded by zoning. The enabling legislation related to zoning
during that period, one could argue, compelled his decision. 1 Or he
might have been constrained by the reality of the flight to the suburbs that
was under way.' We look somewhat askance at Euclid today because
only now, in an age of homeless people and locked-up urban ghettoes, are
we able to see its broader implications.
But the power of narrative structuring is by no means limited to cases
as politically, economically, and ideologically fraught as Euclid. One even
finds narrative dominance in the most seemingly apolitical Admiralty
cases-as in, for example, what constitutes a vessel being ready for sea.
You can hear the sea chanties echoing through the minds of the learned
justices deciding that a vessel in dry dock undergoing repairs could not be
accounted as one causing wrongful death since in principle it was not
ready for sea.33 The repair task that killed the worker in question, not a
30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31. For the background of this case, see ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS
(1987), as well as LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 133-34, 593-94
(2d ed. 1988).
32. See FISHMAN, supra note 31.
33. See United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613
(1959).
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crew member, was one formerly performed at sea by members of the
crew. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent along quite different narrative lines,
arguing that the majority's holding had the effect of passing on the
benefits of advancing marine technology to shipowners while ignoring the
welfare of those who manned the ships.' The power of narrative seemed
to have prevailed even on so austerely technical a legal issue as this one.
Yet, in the very same year, another technically similar case-involving the
alleged wrongful death of a non-seaman called in to repair a faulty pump
delivering oil from the ship's hold to a dock to which the ship was
secured-was decided in favor of the decedent.3' In close calls, narrative
genre may make a large difference.
One of the last pieces written by my late colleague Paul Freund relates
to the Constitutional issue of "state action."' In it, he raises the question
whether the State can be deemed responsible for what itpermits, i.e., does
not forbid. If so, can private action thus permitted be regarded under
certain circumstances as delegated state action?' It is a complicated legal
issue that brings to mind what might be called prototype legal narratives.
Is there a preference for legal narratives about violations of prohibitions?
And are there other hidden narrative preferences as well? What of the
balance in the law of torts between legal criteria of moral fault, strict
responsibility, and objective negligence? Thomas Grey's study of Justice
Holmes's balancing of the three in American tort law suggests that,
perhaps, the three genres of tort story are in some pragmatic symbiosis
with each other, rather like a family of stories.3" It is difficult to believe
such issues as these are entirely legal in nature, with no overlay from a
narrative tradition. In a word, certain broad issues of legal interpretation
may be akin to issues of literary or mythological interpretation, involving
the narrative predilections of an interpretive community beyond the
community of legal practitioners. This is not a new view, of course, but
it is one that is still badly in need of deeper study.?9
34. See id. at 619-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 1959).
36. See Paul Freund, The 'StateAction' Problem, 135 PRoC. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 3-12
(1991).
37. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent, "Our Government is the potent,
omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." Id.

This of course raises the deeper question whether and under what circumstances the
teacher is responsible for what the students learn.
38. See THOMAS GREY, JuSTIcnE HOLMES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (forthcoming)
(presented to the Faculty Workshop at the New York University School of Law on Mar.

10 1993).
39. See JACKSON, supranote 18.
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IV.
How do lawyers and the courts get the world to go along with them
in the use of the specialized forms of legal narrative? Is it simply a matter
of being compelled to do so? My colleagues' and I have been studying
how people's ordinary, everyday trouble narratives get transformed into
law narratives that suit the requirements of both legal procedure and legal
rules. We start with the ordinary person's first encounter with a lawyer,
using simulations of attorney and client played out by law students. Within
a few minutes of the start of a client-attorney interview, even intending
young lawyers are subtly at work transforming their clients' commonsense trouble stories into ones conforming to legal requirements. The
clients' narratives quickly and easily take on a required legal shape. They
soon accept that the initial canonical state, the breach, and the redress of
a legal story, while still the required constituents of a story, must take on
a different form in litigation than they take in life. But from the start they
are well versed in what it takes to make a narrative believable and
compelling. What an attorney teaches a client to do in order to "behave
law" is not storytelling per se. Clients already know how to do that. Nor
do they have to be taught how to tell a story with rhetorical intent. They
have known that since childhood. Learning to "behave law" seems, rather,
to be a matter, first, of adapting to certain procedural rules, and then
replacing old narrative constituents with new ones-refining old construals
of thoughtlessness with new ones about objective negligence, transforming
old notions about a "nice little swimming pool in the backyard" into the
concept of attractive nuisance, and the rest. The ordinary client has little
trouble with this, and lawyers have little trouble getting them to pour new
legal wine into old narrative bottles.
It is not surprising that, on the whole, the law works in spite of its
logical impenetrability and its seeming formal contradictions. For it is
organized much as ordinary experience is organized: in familiar narrative
terms. It easily takes the form we speak of so comfortably as reality. The
law, in that sense, seems to be rather prototypical of the way in which a
culture structures the world of its participants.
This article, hopefully, provides some idea of how a cultural
psychologist engages with the law. I have not said a single word about
justice; nor do my colleagues do so very often. I had hoped that by
ferreting out some of the procedural and psychological underpinnings of
law, a concept of justice would emerge as an outcome. That may yet
happen. But it seems more likely that law begins with an intuitive sense
40. Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Peggy Davis at the New York University
School of Law.
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of justice, some primitive normative principle such as Kelsen proposed.4 1
As it develops, it devises procedures and principles that aim, never with
full success, to instantiate that intuition where contested particulars are
concerned. In doing so, it taps the full range of human interpretive
activity. That is what makes the interface between law and the human
sciences so rich. For whatever the theory of law turns out to be, it will
surely not be about law alone.

41. See HANs KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg
trans. 1961) (1949); see also H.L.A. HART, supra note 28, for a discussion of this
general point.

